As the introduction to this book states: "Few subjects have stimulated a more intensive intellectual interchange than the nature of the human soul and its relationship to the body" (p. 3). All thirteen chapters are published here for the first time. The first four examine the developing conceptualization of the soul and its relationship to the body as perceived by the Greeks. Much here is familiar but well presented. In As Stephen Voss notes in chapter 8, whilst for Aristotelians the study of the soul was part of the "science of nature", Descartes' groundbreaking step was to exclude the soul from the scope of physical enquiry (p. 176). The remaining five chapters deal with this Cartesian legacy. Thomas Lennon discusses how Pierre Bayle recorded and annotated the debate among materialists, Cartesians, and Leibnizian monadology. Francois Duchesneau examines the animism of Georg Stahl and his polemic with Leibniz. John Wright discusses two types of dualism in eighteenth-century medicine: "substance dualism", which held that body and soul consisted of different and incompatible substances, and "function dualism", which assigned thought functions to the soul (mind) and life functions to the body. These two groups were closer than they maintained. Plagues, poisons and potions is a thorough-going description of the deliberations, legislation, and conspiracies in Geneva during plague time taken from two sources: criminal records, which begin in 1390, and the minutes of the city council, which begin in 1409. Naphy's analysis stretches from the earliest references to plague in these sources (1459) to the plague's final assault in 1640. He argues persuasively against common assumptions that conspiracies to spread plague in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were coupled with and dependent on witchcraft either in the minds of the accused or the prosecuting bodies. Except for the plague of 1571, where witchcraft became a principal crime, charges of sorcery were altogether missing from the criminal investigations of both earlier and later plagues in Geneva. Instead of depending on the supernatural as with witchcraft prosecutions, the trials of those accused of spreading plague relied on accusations that pinpointed a small and interrelated community of health professionals, principally those who cleaned and cleared the houses of the plague dead, and on physical evidence-boxes of grease concocted from recipes that mixed pus from the buboes of the plague stricken that was allegedly smeared on doors to spread plague. Further, the motivation interpreted by the courts for such atrocities was not the work of Satan or dependent on other supernatural phenomena but instead turned on the mundane-personal profit.
Indeed, Naphy sides with the prosecution, seeing these trials less as figments of the imagination of a warwearied, plague-battered, religiously intolerant, and paranoid ruling class and more as actual cases of human greed, acts of ambition or survival. First, Naphy argues that consistently, through the sixteenth century, the magistrates rebuked initial accusations of plague spreading and made charges of plague conspiracy only after a large volume of testimony and other circumstantial evidence had been accumulated. Secondly, he claims that torture was not a device to drive such accusations from the mouths of the innocent; rather, it was applied as a last resort, in fact, after a court in the English common law tradition would have already convicted the accused. Thirdly, he shows that those charged with spreading the plague came almost exclusively from the health services, whose employment depended on the plague's perpetuation. Plague not only afforded them their employment, it gave them free range
